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The Medium Is the Archive
Enrico Terrone
There has been much discussion about how digital technologies have 
changed the media. In this paper I will propose a reflection on how 
digital technologies can also deeply modify our conception of the media. 
In particular, I will show how digital technologies challenge a number 
of conceptual distinctions that underlie, almost as dogmas, most 
current discussions on media. I will analyse and criticise the following 
dogmatic distinctions: communication / recording; medium / archive; 
vehicle / store; act / object; content / form.
1  Communication / Recording 
Media theory has emerged as a theory of communication, with oral 
language and conversation as paradigms. In this theoretical framework, 
recording has generally been treated as a secondary moment, as a 
secondary function with respect to communication.
This priority of communication characterises the two theories of 
communication that are perhaps the most influential of the twentieth 
century: Austin’s and Searle’s linguistic pragmatics on the Anglo-
Saxon analytical side; Saussure’s, Barthes’ and Metz’s semiotics on 
the francophone  continental side (but one could also mention, in 
German culture, Gadamer’s hermeneutics or Habermas’s theory 
of communicative action). In these theories, communication is 
fundamentally conceived as a transfer of thoughts from one mind to 




Film, with its dependence on a technological device and with 
its ontological vocation to record reality, at first was an exception to 
this rule, but semiotic and pragmatic approaches have contributed to 
include the domain of communication. For film, understood in general 
as the medium of motion pictures, lies at the very boundary between 
communication and recording, I will treat it as our main example in 
this paper. 
In his critique of semiotics (in the essay ‘Le puits et la pyramide. 
Introduction à la sémiologie de Hegel’) and pragmatics (in the essay 
‘Signature, événement, contexte’), Jacques Derrida (1972) has criticised 
the perfect transparency and autonomy of the linguistic medium, 
showing that these are nothing but an illusory effect produced by the 
transient and evanescent substance of the human voice. Indeed, as 
Derrida (1967b) himself argues, language, just like thought, cannot do 
without some material support, because language and thought require 
memory, which requires matter. In Aristotelian terms, one might say 
that, although language and thought may appear as pure actuality, they 
rely on memory, which is instead pure potentiality, and potentiality 
means matter. 
Thus, against a conception of communication as a linear transfer 
of thoughts, Derrida (1967a, 1967b, 1972, and 1995) emphasises the 
mediating role of the material object, which may be the sound of the 
voice or writing or another transcription technique. In this way, the 
recording is no longer a mere appendix of communication, but becomes 
an active part of its process.
As pointed out by Maurizio Ferraris (2009), Derrida’s intuition 
has been vividly confirmed by the diffusion of the digital medium, 
whose structural features contradict the illusory transparency of the 
oral language (as well as that of television as a medium), making it 
much more similar to writing and film. The digital revolution upsets 
the distinction between recording and communication, and unifies 
the two domains. That is to say, while we communicate, we record; 
and while we record, we communicate. For example, sending an SMS 
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or an e-mail is communicating and at the same time recording what 
has been communicated; symmetrically, uploading files on a network 
amounts to recording and at the same time communicates what has been 
recorded. Likewise, Facebook is a communication space that records 
everything that is communicated, while YouTube is a recording space 
that communicates everything that is recorded. 
Digital technologies thus reveal that communication and recording 
are not two different processes, but rather two different ways of 
describing the same process. Assuming that communication is an act 
by which a thought is transferred from one mind to another (we shall 
see later how much this statement is questionable), this act requires 
the production of an object, which implies a recording (in the case of 
writing) or at least the possibility of recording (in the case of the voice). 
In the process of communication, such an object is as crucial as the act.
2  Medium / Archive
On the one hand, the medium is generally conceived of as a system of 
techniques and practices by which information passes from the sender 
to the recipient. On the other hand, the archive is defined as a system 
of techniques and practices by which information is stored. The notion 
of archive is traditionally subordinated to that of medium, in the same 
way that recording is subordinated to communication. The medium 
is considered the place of living communication, while the archive is 
considered the place of recording, that is to say of ‘dead’ or ‘frozen’ 
communication. According to this traditional approach, the archive 
contains everything that has already been communicated.
But we have seen that the digital medium reveals an archive 
structure, and this leads us to a circle: the medium is the condition 
of communication, since we communicate through the medium; 
communication is the condition of registration, since we record what 
has been communicated; recording is the condition of the archive, since 
what we put in the archive are recordings; the archive is the condition 
of the medium, since the digital medium is constituted by databases, 
that is to say archives. So the medium is the condition of the archive 
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and, at the same time, the archive is the condition of the medium.
To get out of this circle, we must recognise that the medium and the 
archive are not two different systems, but rather two different ways of 
describing the same system. The medium is the surface of the archive, 
the archive is the depth of the medium.
So the medium is not only a communication space, but also a 
recording space, and the archive is not only a recording space, but 
also a communication space. It is nevertheless useful to use the two 
terms in order to distinguish the prevalence of the communicative 
function (in the case of the medium) or the prevalence of the recording 
function (in the case of the archive). But we must never forget that even 
the most transparent medium (such as language) is always based on 
physical mediation (voice, memory), and symmetrically even the most 
impenetrable archive keeps the possibility of a communication. The 
medium is an archive that records for a limited time, the archive is a 
medium that communicates over a long period.
3  Vehicle / Store
The distinction between medium and archive relies on a metaphor: 
meaning is a commodity that is transported. This main metaphor 
entails a series of secondary metaphors: the medium is the vehicle 
of meaning and communicating is conveying meaning through the 
vehicle (for a recipient who will extract it from the vehicle); the archive 
is the store of meaning and to record is to deposit the meaning in the 
store (for a user who will extract it from the store).
But the metaphor that meaning is a commodity that is transported 
raises a big problem: goods can be transported because they are in 
the physical world, but the meaning is in the mind and cannot exist 
regardless of  it. The most we can do is to act and produce things – 
including words, sounds, images – in order to generate meaning in 
the minds of others. The metaphor of the transport of meaning is 
unsatisfactory, especially for audiovisual objects, which can create 
meaning far beyond the intentions of the communicator. Making a 
film, for instance, does not consist of putting a message in a bottle, that 
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is, in conveying meaning from the mind of the director to the minds 
of the spectators. Rather, making a film consists in building a tool 
that can produce different affects and meanings for different people.
Even in its metaphorical foundation, the distinction between the 
medium and the archive is therefore untenable, because it is above all 
the metaphor of meaning as a commodity to be transported that is 
untenable. As linguist Michael J. Reddy (1979) points out in his essay 
The Conduit Metaphor, this model of communication reifies meaning 
in a deceptive and dehumanising way leading us to treat thoughts as 
if they had the same kind of external and intersubjective reality as 
lamps and tables. 
The medium does not directly transmit thoughts. Instead, it allows 
us to produce objects that are capable, under the appropriate conditions, 
of generating thoughts in the minds of the recipients. Likewise, the 
archive does not directly store thoughts. Instead, it store objects that 
are capable, under under the appropriate conditions, of generating 
thoughts in the minds of the recipients. Therefore, we should turn our 
attention to these objects and these conditions.
4  Act / Object
The act of communication is traditionally conceived of as the transport 
of meaning through the vehicle, and as well as the recording object 
as the box that makes it possible to deposit meaning in the store. Yet, 
deconstructing the distinction between the medium and the archive 
involves that a work cannot be reduced either to the transport of 
meaning or the storage of meaning. Let us consider a film. This cannot 
be reduced either to the act of communication or to the recording 
object. The film is both an act and an object: an act that is iterated by 
objects, and is inseparable act from the objects it has produced. The 
film is an act that produces effects as long as its objects persist, just as 
the emission of light propagates as long as its rays persist. The film as 
an object is the propagation of the film as an act. What we call both 
medium and archive is the space of this propagation.
On the side of the medium, one tends to privilege the act and to 
36
Enrico Terrone
remove the mediation of the object (in particular, as we saw, in the 
paradigmatic case of the language). Symmetrically, on the side of the 
archive, one tends to focus on the object as if it was separated from the act 
that generated it. In both cases, one underestimates something essential: 
from the medium’s perspective, one underestimates the relevance of the 
material determinations in relation to the communicative intention; 
from the archive’s perspective, one underestimates the circumstances of 
production and reception in comparison to the existence of the object.
To consider the film as an act rather than an object may seem 
odd, but what is really odd is to consider the film exclusively as a 
recording object (on the archive side) or to treat it exclusively as an act 
of communication (on the side of the medium). New ontologies of art 
like those proposed by Gregory Currie (1989), Jerrold Levinson (1990) 
and David Davies (2004) highlight that works that have always been 
treated as objects should also be treated as acts. In fact, in appreciating 
a work, we also appreciate what an agent has done.
Therefore, in the archive, there is more than a merely material object; 
there is an object that iterates an act and is capable of eliciting thoughts 
precisely because of this. Likewise, in the medium, we do not find a 
simple act of transfer of meaning, but also an object to which the act 
entrusts the task of eliciting thoughts.
Too rigid conceptions of the medium and the archive break the 
essential link between the act of communication and the material 
object, but this link is essential to understand what a work really is. 
Consider what happens when we watch a film. On the one hand, we are 
directly confronted with images and sounds instead of pure thoughts 
and intentions. On the other hand, we do not consider these images 
and sounds simply for what they are or what they represent; we also 
treat them as the outcomes of a communicative act.
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5  Content / Form
We have considered the distinction between the medium and the 
archive, just as the metaphor that meaning is a commodity that has 
been transported, which is at its root. Among the implications  of 
these, there is the distinction between the content and the form (or 
the content and mode, or content and style, or the signified and the 
signifier: too often attempts have been made to solve conceptual 
problems by appealing to lexical shifts).
Meaning, as a transported commodity, must be contained in a 
container (called from time to time: form, mode of representation, 
style or signifier). But if we deconstruct the metaphor of meaning as a 
commodity, we also deconstruct the distinction between content and 
form. Works like films are not boxes, so they have no content, and no 
form either.
A film is rather an act that produces an object that is capable of 
eliciting effects. To study a film is to study at the same time the act, the 
object and the effects. A film's screenplay, its staging, its cinematography 
and its music, its framing and its editing, are all components of the 
act that creates the object and produces the effects. We should not 
think that something transports and something else is transported: 
the different components of the film all have the same ontological 
dignity. So, in a film, there is no content to be formatted, transported 
and stored. A film is just an act embodied in an object.
Usually, the form / content distinction is applied to works like films 
in two different ways. Firstly, one can call ‘content’ the entities to which 
the film refers (roughly the narrative information that in fiction films 
corresponds to the screenplay), while calling ‘form’ the representation 
of this content through images and sounds. In practice, this is just the 
distinction between screenwriting and film-making. Yet, on closer 
inspection, these is not content to be transported and a form that 
contains it; these are just two stages of a production process. Secondly, 
one can call ‘content’ the intention of communication of the author and 
‘form’ the work that expresses it (by means of both screenwriting and 
film-making). Yet, this leads us back to the metaphor of the transport 
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of meaning with all its problems. Thus, the distinction between form 
and content boils down to a misleading way of expressing the plain truth 
that a work like a film is both an intentional act and a material object. 
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